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Chapter 7
Maternity Leave Laws in the United States
in the Light of European Legislation
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer
A comparison of maternity (and paternity) leave laws in the United States
and the European Union could be stated in two phrases: United States,
not much; European Union, a lot. Countries in the European Union and in
much of the world provide lengthy paid maternity leaves and some pater-
nity leaves. Although many companies in the United States provide their
workers with paid family leaves, many do not. United States law does not
require or fund paid family leaves. This makes it difficult for workers in the
United States to balance family concerns with work.
The difference between how the United States and the countries
in the European Union provide family leave benefits raises questions
in the context of “internationalization.” Internationalization suggests
information-sharing across borders. With increased information, countries
and companies acquire new ideas, or learn more about “foreign” ideas.
“Good” ideas can be borrowed from one country and adapted to fit the
needs of another. Internationalization also suggests increased interaction
between countries. Because there is such a discrepancy between the United
States and the countries of the European Union (and other parts of the
world) in how the governments handle social needs, one wonders why the
U.S. stands alone and whether its policies affect international interactions,
including trade, between the United States and the European Union.
Perhaps the United States will not continue to stand alone. During the
first half of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court shifted
from striking down laws that regulate workers’ wages and hours, to uphold-
ing them. In opinions reflecting more concern for workers, it occasionally
looked to European laws already in place. Although considerable resistance
remains in the United States to laws that regulate the workplace, the United
States has slowly enacted laws to provide some social benefits and to pro-
hibit discrimination in the workplace. In recent years the Supreme Court
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has upheld these laws, although not without dissent. Perhaps this trend will
continue. Perhaps the United States will look to the European Union, and
internationalization will have a role in softening United States resistance to
governmentally required or provided paid family benefits for workers. On
the other hand, that resistance is deeply entrenched.
One can see the competing values invoked by United States proponents
and opponents of laws that regulate the workplace by looking at Supreme
Court cases that strike down or uphold those laws. Since the Supreme
Court has the power to invalidate acts of Congress on the ground that
they violate the Constitution,1 much social legislation in the United States
gets challenged in the Supreme Court. This discussion will describe the
difficulty that the United States has had in passing social legislation by
viewing it through the eyes of the United States Supreme Court during
five different eras in the twentieth century: Laissez-faire economics and
wage and hour legislation, 1905–1941; President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
“New Deal” Social Security Act, 1935–1937; World War II and employment
legislation, 1940–1948; the Civil Rights and Women’s movements and em-
ployment legislation, 1963–1978; and, the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993. This study will conclude with questions raised by viewing domestic
United States policy in the context of “internationalization” as described
by the other chapters in this volume. This comparison guides the author’s
conclusions, which were influenced by this discussion.
7.1 Laissez-Faire Economics and Wage and Hour
Legislation, 1905–1941
In the early twentieth century when the United States Supreme Court was
striking down laws that regulate hours and wages of workers, at least some
European countries already had those laws in place. As the Supreme Court
began to change its view about such legislation, it gave an occasional glance
toward European laws. Before that change, however, the divergence in atti-
tudes about social legislation was illustrated by Lochner v. New York,2 one
of the early cases dealing with governmental regulation of working condi-
tions that reached the United States Supreme Court.
In Lochner the State of New York had passed a law preventing bakery
owners from requiring employees to work for more than 10 hours a day or
60 hours a week. It was enacted after studies had shown serious danger,
and more danger than in most occupations, to workers from long hours in
bakeries. A bakery owner in New York who had been indicted for having
violated New York’s law argued that it violated the Due Process clause of
1 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
2 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That clause prohibits
states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”
Although the New York courts agreed with the state’s legislators that the
law was valid,3 the Supreme Court disagreed, having reviewed the case
because the bakery owners’ challenge to the law was under the United
States Constitution. The Court said that a state’s police power to protect
its citizens was not unlimited. The Court, applying its “common under-
standing” of the workplace, asserted that “the trade of a baker has never
been regarded as an unhealthy one.”4 Perhaps reflecting the “rugged indi-
vidualism” often associated with United States’ policies, the Court invoked
“the right of the individual to his personal liberty interest,”5 holding that an
employee had the freedom to contract with an employer to work as many
hours as he wanted to support his family. Almost as an aside, the Court
noted that, “Of course the liberty of contract relating to labor includes
both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the other
to sell labor,”6 thus dispensing with the suggestion that workers, needing
jobs and having little leverage, require protection from employers. Again
emphasizing individuality, the Court said,
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able
to assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the
State, interfering with their independence of judgment and of action.7
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Lochner viewed the case differently. In con-
trast to the Court’s view of the equal relationship between employee and
employer, he said,
It may be that the statute had its origin, in part, in the belief that employers and
employes [sic] in such establishments were not upon an equal footing, and that
the necessities of the latter often compelled them to submit to such exactions
as unduly taxed their strength. Be this as it may, the statute must be taken as
expressing the belief of the people of New York that, as a general rule, and in the
case of the average man, labor in excess of sixty hours during a week in such
establishments may endanger the health of those who thus labor.8
He then asserted that the Court should not be “concerned with the wis-
dom or policy of legislation”9 as long as the law had a substantial relation-
ship to a lawful purpose, in New York’s case, to protect health. His view
3 Id. at 57.
4 Id. at 59.
5 Id. at 56.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 57.
8 Id. at 69.
9 Id.
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did not prevail. Thus, in 1905, rugged individualism triumphed over state
protection.
State protection triumphed three years later, but only for women. Ore-
gon had passed a law that prohibited employers in a “mechanical estab-
lishment, or factory, or laundry” from employing women for more than
10 hours a day. The owner of a laundry was convicted of having violated
the law. He challenged its constitutionality in a case that reached the U.S
Supreme Court, Muller v. Oregon.10 The Court distinguished Lochner on
the ground that women were different from men, frail and in need of pro-
tection. The unanimous Court explained,
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place
her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially
true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not,
by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on
her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon
the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent
upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior physical strength,
and this control in various forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the
present . . .Education was long denied her, and while now the doors of the school
room are opened and her opportunities for acquiring knowledge are great, yet even
with that and the consequent increase of capacity for business affairs it is still
true that in the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor with her
brother. . . .. [S]he is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed
for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary
for men and could not be sustained. . . .The limitations which this statute places
upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the
time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the
benefit of all.11
While initially hailed as a progressive decision allowing states to begin
to regulate sweatshop working conditions, it backfired on women, making
them less desirable and valuable employees because they could not work
as long as men could. In addition, the Court’s demeaning language justified
the view that women were inferior workers.
Muller led to a debate that continues to the present, whether laws
that are written only for women can ever be advantageous to them, even
when those laws deal with conditions biologically and indisputably unique
to them, such as pregnancy and breastfeeding. The competing views in
the debate are known as “equal treatment” versus “special treatment”
or “equal opportunity.” Whether one chooses the “special treatment” or
“equal opportunity” title at times dictates the outcome of the debate: “equal
10 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417 (1908).
11 Id. at 421–422.
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opportunity” being preferred by its proponents, equality having special
place in United States law and policy.12
Having upheld maximum hour laws for women in Muller, the Court up-
held that protection for men nine years later. In 1917 Bunting v. Oregon13
upheld a maximum hour law for both men and women. In upholding the
law, the Court never mentioned Lochner’s freedom-of-contract-due-process
analysis although the lawyer representing Bunting, who had been convicted
for having violated the law, relied upon it. Apparently the arguments of fu-
ture Justice Felix Frankfurter, representing Oregon, convinced the Justices
to ignore Lochner. Frankfurter argued in Bunting that Lochner’s reasoning
was outmoded as it had been based, not on “scientific scrutiny” or “au-
thoritative interpretation of accredited facts” but on the Justices’ “common
understanding”14 of working conditions. The Court in Bunting upheld the
hours law, quoting with approval from the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion,
“In view of the well-known fact that the custom in our industries does not sanction
a longer service than 10 hours per day, it cannot be held, as a matter of law, that
the legislative requirement is unreasonable or arbitrary as to hours of labor.”
To add justification to its holding, the Court quoted further from the
Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion:
“Statistics show that the average daily working time among working-men in differ-
ent countries is, in Australia, 8 hours; in Great Britain, 9; in the United States, 9
3/4; in Denmark, 9 3/4; in Norway, 10; Sweden, France, and Switzerland, 10 1/2;
Germany, 10 1/4; Belgium, Italy, and Austria, 11; and in Russia, 12 hours.”15
For the first time in the Supreme Court’s consideration of maximum
hour laws, “internationalization” had a role.
Although in Bunting the Supreme Court had upheld laws regulating
hours for both men and women, it continued to be leery of state legis-
lation that interfered with employers’ decisions. This was still a time of
laissez faire economics in the U.S. Five years after Bunting was decided,
the Court in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,16 in 1923, struck down a law
passed by Congress for the District of Columbia that required employers
to pay at least a minimum wage to women and children.17 Although fifteen
years prior in Muller the Court had said that “it is still true that in the
struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor with her brother,”
the Court in Adkins did not equate wage laws with health or, apparently,
“subsistence.” Rather, noting the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,
12 See Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“nor shall any
State . . .deny to any person . . .the equal protection of the laws”..).
13 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
14 Bunting, 243 U.S., at 432.
15 Id. at 438–439.
16 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
17 Congress was responsible for the District of Columbia, the capital of the United States.
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which gave women in the United States the right to vote, the Court said
that, except for physical differences, inequalities between men and women
had “come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point.”18
Although the Court had not cited Lochner in its earlier decision in
Bunting, in Adkins the Court revived Lochner and its freedom-of-contract-
liberty-interest analysis, saying,
[W]hile the physical differences [between men and women] must be recognized in
appropriate cases, and legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly
take them into account, we cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature
age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of
contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under similar
circumstances. To do so would be to ignore all the implications to be drawn from
the present day trend of legislation, as well as that of common thought and usage,
by which woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that she must
be given special protection or be subjected to special restraint in her contractual
and civil relationships.19
The Court thus articulated, in the context of minimum wage legislation,
part of the “equal treatment/special treatment” debate that had begun after
Muller had upheld maximum hour legislation for women. In Adkins the
Court chose the “equal treatment” side of the debate. Apparently limiting
hours, and in doing so decreasing women’s wages, was one thing, but in-
creasing their wages was something else entirely.
Chief Justice Taft in his dissent in Bunting pointed out that the Court’s
reasoning disadvantaged women by creating unequal opportunities, for the
legislators who enacted the minimum wage law for women might have as-
sumed that “the class receiving least pay, are not upon a full level of equality
of choice with their employer and in their necessitous circumstances are
prone to accept pretty much anything that is offered.”20 Felix Frankfurter,
who had been counsel to Oregon in Bunting, and was counsel for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Adkins, had argued that Congress’ findings from its
hearings supported the law’s rationality. Congress, he said,
found that alarming public evils had resulted, and threatened in increasing mea-
sure, from the widespread existence of a deficit between the essential needs for
decent life and the actual earnings of large numbers of women workers of the
District. In the judgment of Congress, based upon unchallenged facts, these con-
ditions impaired the health of this generation of women and thereby threatened
the coming generation through undernourishment, demoralizing shelter and in-
sufficient medical care. . . .The purpose of the act was to provide for the deficit
between the cost of women’s labor, i.e., the means necessary to keep labor going –
and any rate of women’s pay below the minimum level for living, and thereby to
eliminate all the evils attendant upon such deficit upon a large scale.21
18 Adkins, 261 U.S., at 553.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 562, (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
21 Adkins, 261 U.S., at 528–529.
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his dissent in Adkins, pointed to min-
imum wage laws in Great Britain, “Victoria” (Canada) and Australia as ev-
idence of the reasonableness of such laws.22 Thus, Justice Holmes used
“internationalization” to dispute the reasoning of the majority. His argu-
ments eventually prevailed when the Supreme Court, in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,23 overruled Adkins and its reliance on Lochner fourteen
years later in 1937.
West Coast Hotel applied the reasoning of Muller, which had upheld max-
imum hour legislation for women, to a minimum wage law for women that
had been passed in the State of Washington. The Court held,
What can be closer to the public interest than the health of women and their
protection from unscrupulous and overreaching employers? And if the protection
of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it be said
that the requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to
meet the very necessities of existence is not an admissible means to that end?
The legislature of the State was clearly entitled to consider the situation of women
in employment, the fact that they are in the class receiving the least pay, that
their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of
those who would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances. The legisla-
ture was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the “sweating system,”
the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare
cost of living, thus making their very helplessness the occasion of a most injurious
competition.24
One year after the Court had decided West Coast Hotel, Congress passed
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which prohibited employers in specified in-
dustries from employing child labor and required them to pay, to both men
and women, a minimum wage and an extra wage for work over 40 hours
per week.25 This was the first time a wage and hour law was enacted by the
federal government to govern employers in all of the states.
With Felix Frankfurter, who had successfully represented Oregon in
Bunting and unsuccessfully represented the District of Columbia in Adkins,
now on the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the FLSA in 1941 in United States v. Darby.26 In Darby a manufacturer
of finished lumber was indicted for selling it across state lines without hav-
ing paid his workers the minimum wage or extra wage for overtime work.27
Most of the Court’s unanimous opinion in Darby was devoted to explaining
why the federal government had power under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution to regulate actions of state employers. The court
addressed the issue, which had elicited so much discussion in prior years,
22 Id. at 570–571, (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
24 Id. at 398–399.
25 29 U.S.C. §201 et. seq.
26 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
27 Id. at 111.
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whether the government could protect workers with wage and hour laws,
in three sentences,
Since our decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, it is no longer
open to question that the fixing of a minimum wage is within the legislative power
and that the bare fact of its exercise is not a denial of due process under the
Fifth more than under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor is it any longer open to
question that it is within the legislative power to fix maximum hours. . . ..Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426. . . .Similarly the statute is
not objectionable because applied alike to both men and women. Cf. Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426.28
Lawyers from the United States commonly use the abbreviation “cf.”
(“confer”) as a signal that the cited case does not stand exactly for the
proposition for which it is being cited, but could be relevant. Bunting,
“cfed” in this way by the Court, had upheld maximum hour laws for men
and women, but had avoided the question whether minimum wage laws for
men and women, previously upheld only for women in West Coast Hotel,
would be constitutional. Darby decided that they were, with little comment.
As described above, the debate about the validity of wage and hour laws
continued from 1905 until 1941. While wage and hour laws regulate em-
ployers’ decisions about those matters, they do not provide governmental
benefits directly to workers. Before the FLSA had been passed and the wage
hour debate had ended, after Roosevelt had been elected and with the Great
Depression worsening, the federal government passed the Social Security
Act of 1935, which would involve the federal government in providing ben-
efits directly to individuals.29
7.2 President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” Social
Security Act
The Social Security Act of 1935, a major federal program to deal with a
major national depression, created a number of programs. It provided re-
tirement benefits (Old Age Assistance) for working men and federal unem-
ployment benefits to be funded by taxing employee wages. While the old age
assistance would be administered entirely by the federal government, the
unemployment benefits would be administered by the states under federal
supervision. The Social Security Act also authorized the federal govern-
ment to provide grant money from its general tax revenues to states so
28 Darby, 312 U.S., at 125.
29 Wilbur J. Cohen, Symposium: The New Deal and its Legacy: The Development of
the Social Security Act of 1935: Reflection Some Fifty Years Later, 68 Minn. L. Rev 379,
382–383 (1983). Wilbur Cohen is regarded as among the principal architects of the Social
Security Act.
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that they could administer aid to needy dependent children and the needy
elderly and blind.30
When the Social Security Act was passed in 1935, the Supreme Court
had yet to decide West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, which would overturn Ad-
kins v. Children’s Hospital.31 In Adkins, twelve years prior to the passage
of the Social Security Act, the Supreme Court had invalidated the District of
Columbia’s minimum wage law for women and revived Lochner’s freedom-
of-contract-as-liberty-interest under the Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution. Although the minimum wage act at issue in Adkins had been passed
by Congress, the act was not a federal law in that it applied to the entire
country; rather, it was an act passed pursuant to Congress’s role of govern-
ing the District of Columbia, the capital of the United States. Thus, all the
wage/hour cases up to that time had involved federal Constitutional chal-
lenges to state, or quasi-state in the case of the District of Columbia, laws.
As described above, many of these state statutes had been struck down by
the Supreme Court. Ironically, the Social Security Act was challenged in
the courts on the ground that it violated the “state’s rights” provision of the
United States Constitution, the Tenth Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment was the last of the amendments that were added
in 1791 to the Constitution, which had been ratified in 1789. It provided
that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.” The challenges to the Social Security Act were heard in
two cases: Steward Machine Company v. Davis32 resolved the challenge to
the unemployment benefits program of the Act, while Helvering v. Davis33
resolved the challenge to the retirement benefits program. Because the
programs were to be funded by wage reductions (taxes) from employees’
pay, the suits were brought nominally against Davis, who was the Collector
of Internal Revenue. In both cases the opinions were written by Justice
Benjamin Cardozo and announced on the same day in May of 1937, only
two months after the Court decided West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.
In Steward Machine and Helvering, Justice Cardozo rejected the Tenth
Amendment challenges by describing the national nature of the Great
Depression.
[T]here is need to remind ourselves of facts as to the problem of unemployment
that are now matters of common knowledge. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379. . . .During the years 1929 to 1936, when the country was passing through
a cyclical depression, the number of the unemployed mounted to unprecedented
heights. Often the average was more than 10 million; at times a peak was attained
of 16 million or more. Disaster to the breadwinner meant disaster to dependents.
30 Id.
31 Adkins, 261 U.S. 525.
32 Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
33 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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Accordingly the roll of the unemployed, itself formidable enough, was only a partial
roll of the destitute or needy. The fact developed quickly that the states were
unable to give the requisite relief. The problem had become national in area and
dimensions. There was need of help from the nation if the people were not to
starve. . . .34
The Justices in dissent were outraged. Justices McReynolds said, “The
doctrine thus announced and often repeated [the right of self-government,
by the States], I had supposed was firmly established. . . .. Unfortunately,
the decision just announced opens the way for practical annihilation of
this theory. . . .”35 Justice Sutherland, joined by Justice Van Devanter, said,
“The threat implicit in the present encroachment upon the administrative
functions of the states is that greater encroachments. . . .will follow.”36 Fi-
nally Justice Butler said, “The terms of the measure make it clear that the
tax and credit device was intended to enable federal officers virtually to
control the exertion of powers of the States in a field in which they alone
have jurisdiction and from which the United States is by the Constitution
excluded.”37
In Helvering Justice Cardozo reiterated the theme of national calamity,
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or
parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the
Nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times.
The purge of nation-wide calamity that began in 1929 has taught us many
lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of interests that may once have seemed to
be divided. Unemployment spreads from State to State, the hinterland now settled
that in pioneer days gave an avenue of escape. . . .Spreading from State to State, un-
employment is an ill not particular but general, which may be checked, if Congress
so determines, by the resources of the Nation. If this can have been doubtful until
now, our ruling today in the case of the Steward Machine Co., supra, has set
the doubt at rest. But the ill is all one, or at least not greatly different, whether
men are thrown out of work because there is no longer work to do or because
the disabilities of age make them incapable of doing it. Rescue becomes necessary
irrespective of the cause. The hope behind this statute is to save men and women
from the rigors of the poor house as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot
awaits them when journey’s end is near.38
Considering the laissez faire economics that prevailed in American po-
litical thought in the early part of the twentieth century, and the Supreme
Court’s insistence that it was embedded in the Constitution, the adoption
and judicial upholding of the both the Social Security and the Fair La-
bor Standards Acts were monumental changes. Many compromises were
34 Steward Machine, 301 U.S., at 586–587.
35 Id. at 599 (McReynolds, dissenting).
36 Id. at 616 (Sutherland, dissenting).
37 Id. at 618 (Butler, dissenting).
38 Helvering, 301 U.S., at 641–644.
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required to produce bills that could pass in Congress. As Professor Wilbur
Cohen, who was one of the drafters of the Social Security Act and Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) under President Johnson, said of
the Social Security Act,
Although the Act was viewed as a radical program by some conservatives and
viewed as a conservative one by some liberals, many political figures looked upon
it as a middle-of-the-road program designed to preserve the social and economic
structure of the nation, struggling in the midst of the most severe economic de-
pression the republic had ever encountered. Thus, some individuals vigorously
opposed the program, most others welcomed it, and others, while critical of some
aspects, acknowledged that it was probably the best compromise available at the
time within the structure of a capitalistic, free market economy and a democratic,
representative legislative system.39
One bill that had competed with the Social Security Act’s unemploy-
ment provisions bears mentioning here because it would have provided
maternity benefits. The Workers’ Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill
was modeled, at least in part, on European practices. As Professor Kenneth
Casebeer describes, its “benefits were to be administered through European
style workers’ councils.”40 The Workers’ Bill would have provided for “a
system of unemployment and social insurance for the purpose of providing
insurance for all workers and farmers unemployed through no fault of their
own in amounts equal to average local wages” and for “the establishment
of other forms of social insurance . . .for the purpose of paying workers and
farmers insurance for loss of wages because of part-time work, sickness,
accident, old age, or maternity.”41 Ahead of its time, the Workers’ Bill also
provided that it “shall be extended to workers and farmers without discrim-
ination because of age, sex, race, or color, religious or political opinion,
or affiliation, whether they be industrial, agricultural, domestic, or profes-
sional workers, for all time lost.”42
At various hearings before and after the passage of the Social Security
Act, Congress heard about the need for maternity benefits. Dr. Emily N.
Pierson testified:
There are in the United States 2,425,000 married women of child-bearing age
(18–45 years) gainfully employed in the United States. One in every five workers
is a woman, and of these, one in every four is married. . . .[There is] a very close
relation between economic security and the maternal mortality rate. The other
39 Cohen, supra n. 29, at 382–383 (1983).
40 Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor Or-
ganizaiton and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. Rev 259, 266 (1994).
41 Workers’ Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill quoted in Kenneth M. Casebeer,
Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor Organizaiton and Legal Ide-
ology, 35 B.C. L. Rev 259, 296–297 (1994).
42 Id.
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causative factors, such as the quality and availability of medical care, do not alter
this fact.43
Ella Bloor testified:
I think very few of us who are in the cities realize the poverty that the women are
suffering, especially the young women in the farm districts, on account of not only
the drought and the usual conditions there, but especially the fact of maternity
in these isolated places. . . .We found in the women’s section of the unemployed
congress which took place in Washington recently, when I met with those women
two or three times, that they were especially interested in this part of the bill,
about maternity . . .not only the farm women, but working women everywhere.44
Whether maternity benefits might have received consideration in an-
other bill cannot be known. The fact that those benefits were included in
a bill with a funding mechanism most likely viewed as radical at the time
may not have helped. The Workers’ Bill provided:
Funds for such insurance shall hereafter be provided at the expense of the Gov-
ernment and of employers, and . . .funds to be raised by the Government shall be
secured by taxing inheritance and gifts, and by taxing individual and corporation
incomes of $ 5,000 per year and over. No tax or contribution in any form shall be
levied on workers for the purposes of this Act.45
No doubt this funding mechanism would have faced opposition, espe-
cially from those who still retained not only ardent states rights views, but
also Lochner-type views of the employer-employee relationship. As Profes-
sor Cohen described, the funding mechanism of the Social Security Act was
an important mechanism to maintain its political viability. Professor Cohen
observed that,
Roosevelt was very concerned about the possible political change or repeal of the
old age insurance program in the future. Thus, he supported and justified the use
of contributory payroll taxes to finance the insurance programs as “the” method
that would assure continuation and support of a statutory and political “right”
of individuals to receive benefits without an income or “needs” test in time of
financial constraints.
At the time he signed the Social Security Act into law, President Roosevelt
explained his basic incremental approach when he said that the Social Security
Act “represents a corner stone in a structure which is being built but is by no
43 Social Insurance: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and
Labor, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 56–57 (1936) (statement of Dr. Emily N. Pierson) quoted
in Workers’ Bill quoted in Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American
Social Wage, Labor Organizaiton and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. Rev 259, 294 (1994).
44 Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 2827 Before Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 129–30 (1935) (statement of
Ella Reeve Bloor) quoted in Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American
Social Wage, Labor Organizaiton and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. Rev 259, 294 (1994).
45 Workers’ Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill quoted in Kenneth M. Casebeer,
Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor Organizaiton and Legal Ide-
ology, 35 B.C. L. Rev 259, 296–297 (1994).
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means complete.” The building of the program has been a continuing process
which Roosevelt expected to go on until the program provided protection against
all the major hazards of life “from the cradle to the grave.”46
Although many countries in the European Union and elsewhere had and
have “cradle to grave” protections for their people, Roosevelt’s expecta-
tion of what would happen in the United States has not taken place. Little
by little, however, the Social Security Act has expanded. In 1939 it was
amended to add survivors’ and old-age benefits for wives and widows of
workers covered by Social Security and in 1950 to provide those bene-
fits to husbands and widowers.47 It was amended again in 1956 to include
disability insurance and in 1965 to include Medicare, a medical insurance
program for those of retirement age.48 In 1977 the Supreme Court had
occasion to review the 1939 amendment and said that “dependency, not
need, [was] the criterion for inclusion” of wives and widows.49 That the
“old age” benefits were not to be based on need emphasizes the political
exigency that required the Social Security Act, and its later amendments,
to be an insurance based plan, not a “general welfare” plan.50
7.3 World War II and Employment Legislation, 1940–1948
Maternity benefits never became part of the Social Security Act, nor were
they provided in federal legislation until more that 50 years later. As will
be discussed below, the Family and Medical Leave Act, passed in 1993, was
the first federal statute to provide parental leave and health related leaves,
although they are unpaid, for no more than 12 weeks and are only required
to be given by large employers. By this time European countries, and most
of the countries in the world, provided paid, and usually lengthy, maternity
leaves, frequently funded at least in part with general taxes, not taxes solely
on workers’ wages. Often those countries provide paternity leaves as well.
Although during the New Deal Congress passed much social legislation,
the only legislation related to leaves from work involved veterans. Before
the United States entered World War II at the end of 1941, Congress had
passed the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which provided that
private employers “shall restore” former employees, who were honorably
46 Cohen, supra n. 29, at 407.
47 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216 (1977).
48 Edward D. Berkowitz, Mr. Social Security: The Life of Wilbur J. Cohen (forward by
Joseph A. Califano).
49 Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 213 (holding that differential survival benefits for widows and
widowers violated the Constitution).
50 While the Social Security Act did provide federal grants to the states for welfare for the
needy, general funding for welfare has less political support than insurance-type benefits
in the U.S. See Cohen, supra n. 29 at 406.
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discharged, to their former “position or to a position of like seniority, status,
and pay unless the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make
it impossible or unreasonable to do so.”51 Congress has extended that Act
many times. It is currently known as the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act.52 As with prior acts, it provides employ-
ment leaves for veterans for up to 5 years.53 When veterans return they are
entitled to receive the wages, benefits and seniority they would have had
as if they not been in the service.54 When there was a draft, the veterans’
leave and benefits applied to those who volunteered as well as to those who
were drafted.55 For veterans returning from World War II Congress passed
the “GI bill”, which paid for veteran’s post high school education. During
World War II, not only were maternity benefits not legislated, but at least
one state had passed legislation that excluded women from certain jobs. A
law passed in Michigan in 1945 prohibited women from having jobs as bar-
tenders unless they were the wife or daughter of a male owner. The law was
challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.56
The Supreme Court upheld it in Goesaert v. Cleary57 although there were
three dissenters. Apparently not taking the issue seriously, Justice Frank-
furter in his majority opinion wrote, “Beguiling as the subject is, it need not
detain us long. . . .We are, to be sure, dealing with a historic calling. We meet
the alewife, sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare, . . .”58 The Court held that
the distinction in the Michigan law was rational and concluded, “Since the
line they [in Michigan] have drawn is not without a basis in reason, we
cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind this legis-
lation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize
the calling.”59 As the case was decided in 1948, one might ask whether this
lack of chivalry was related to the fact that men were returning from war.
51 See, Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 383 U.S. 225 (1966), quoting the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940.
52 38 U.S.C. §4301, et seq.
53 38 U.S.C. § 4312.
54 38 U.S.C. §4316 (a) provides, “A person who is reemployed under this chapter is
entitled to the seniority and other rights and benefits determined by seniority that the
person had on the date of the commencement of service in the uniformed services plus
the additional seniority and rights and benefits that such person would have attained if
the person had remained continuously employed.”
55 Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. §2021 et seq.,
38 U.S.C. §§2021, 2024. See also Schaller v. Board of Education of Elmwood Local School
District, 449 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Ohio 1978).
56 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides “nor shall any State . . .deny to any person . . .the equal protection of the laws”.
57 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
58 Id. at 465.
59 Id. at 467.
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Historians differ as to the effect of World War on women’s desire for work
outside the home. Some view it as a time when women indicated a distaste
for employment, illustrated by a popular, although mixed metaphor, that at
the end of the war could be heard “the thundering herds of women stam-
peding back to the nest.”60 Others refer to the famous poster of “Rosie the
Riveter” as ushering in a time when women realized that they were capable
of handling work outside the home and enjoying it.61 Such debates may not
have been as pronounced in Europe as so many men had been lost during
the war.
7.4 The Civil Rights and Women’s Movements, Employment
Legislation, 1963–1978
Very little, if any, federal legislation aided women who wanted or needed
employment until the early 1960s. As a result of the Civil Rights and
Women’s movements, two important acts were passed. In 1963 Congress
passed the Equal Pay Act, which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act
to require employers to pay men and women the same rate for equal work
of similar skill, effort and working conditions.62 One year later Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII of which prohibited employers
from discriminating against workers because of their race, religion, sex,
national origin and color.63 About a decade after Title VII was passed, the
Supreme Court ruled in two cases that discrimination against pregnant
women was not sex discrimination. Geduldig v. Aiello64 involved a consti-
tutional challenge to California’s disability insurance program that covered
all short term disabilities except pregnancy. The Court ruled that because
there were women in both classes of pregnant and nonpregnant people,
discrimination against pregnancy was not sex discrimination. General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert,65 involved a Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII challenge
to an employer’s plan similar to California’s. The Court applied the same
reasoning and also noted that the company was paying more in benefits to
women than to men.
Congress, in response, amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act (PDA) of 1978, which provided:
60 See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison Community Unit School Dist., 818 F.2d 577, 582 (1982)
(quoting Congressman Goodell, 109 Cong. Rec. 9208 (1963)).
61 See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 24 (Poche, J., dissenting).
62 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
63 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.
64 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
65 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work66
Pregnancy issues challenge the concept of equality. If an employer pro-
vides no benefits except those for pregnant women, women may be viewed
as less desirable workers than men, and may also be resented by their col-
leagues. If an employer provides no benefits to anyone, then women are
not singled out. If they need time from work for pregnancy, however, they
will lose their job while men who become fathers will not. Thus, there is
no way to be “equal” because men and women’s reproductive abilities are
not the same. Of course an individual woman could decide not to become
pregnant, but that would not be a beneficial resolution of the debate from a
societal point of view.
The PDA can be read as having both equal opportunity and equal treat-
ment clauses. The first clause defining discrimination, does not specify
whether discrimination is equal treatment or opportunity. The second
clause, in the context of offering benefits, uses explicit “treated the same”
language in the context of pregnancy. The “equal treatment/special treat-
ment or equal opportunity” debate surfaced during the wage and hour
legislation debate. During that time, no matter how the debate was re-
solved, women were disadvantaged. The Court in Muller67 allowed Oregon
to provide women with “special treatment” by upholding a state’s maximum
hours legislation. As noted earlier, although that legislation was designed to
end some of the sweatshop conditions, it backfired against women. Later in
Adkins68 the Court refused to let the District of Columbia provide women
with the “special treatment” of a minimum wage for them. The Court inval-
idated the law on the ground that women should not be treated differently
from men. After Muller, women received lower wages than men; after Ad-
kins, women continued to receive lower wages.
Countries in the European Union generally do not adopt the “equal treat-
ment” model of equality. Rather, their family leave laws frequently provide
lengthier leave for women than for men. This disparity in leaves is criticized
by some as perpetuating the distinction between men’s and women’s jobs,
but praised by others as enabling mothers to both keep their jobs and have
meaningful time with their newborns.
As in the 1910s, in the 1960s and 1970s some states passed their own
employment laws. California passed a law requiring employers to provide
women with up to four months of unpaid leave for disability caused by
66 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).
67 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
68 Adkins, 261 U.S. 525.
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pregnancy. An employer challenged this law on the ground that it was pre-
empted by Title VII, a federal statute which, under the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, invalidates any state statute that interferes with it. In
California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra,69 the employer re-
lied on the “treated the same” language of the PDA, arguing that because
California did not require employers to provide up to four months of leave
to “other persons not [affected by pregnancy] but similar in their ability
or inability to work,” the California law interfered with Title VII. Feminists
filed amicus curiae briefs on both sides of the case. The “equal treatment”
feminists sided with the bank, while the “equal opportunity” feminists sided
with California, which was defending its statute.70 The majority, in an opin-
ion by Justice Thurgood Marshall, held in CalFed that “Congress intended
the PDA to be ‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not
drop – not a ceiling above which they may not rise.’ ”71 Sounding as if he
were adopting the “equal opportunity” approach to Title VII, Justice Mar-
shall also said, “By ‘taking pregnancy into account,’ California’s pregnancy
disability-leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have families with-
out losing their jobs.”72 He did not say, however, that Title VII requires
pregnancy-specific policies to be provided, no matter what programs an
employer does or does not provide, to ensure that women do not have
to choose between families and jobs. To have said that would have been
difficult as the legislative history to the PDA contained specific statements
that it did not require employers to provide benefits if they were not doing
so.73 The federal government’s reluctance to tell employers what to do was
still present.
Justice White, for the dissent in CalFed, quoted that legislative history,
which was from the House Report, and noted that it did not change the
antidiscrimination focus of Title VII and did not give women preferential
treatment.
It must be emphasized that this legislation, operating as part of Title VII, prohibits
only discriminatory treatment. Therefore, it does not require employers to treat
pregnant employees in any particular manner with respect to hiring, permitting
them to continue working, providing sick leave, furnishing medical and hospital
benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter. H. R. 6075 in no way
requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist. The bill
would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employ-
ees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.74
69 California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
70 Id. at 274. See also Candace S. Kovacic[-Fleischer], Remedying Underinclusive
Statutes, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 39, 76–80 (1986).
71 CalFed, at 285, quoting from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.
72 Id. at 289.
73 Id. at 286–287 and at 299 (White, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 299 (White, J. dissenting).
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CalFed did not resolve the equal treatment/equal opportunity debate.
It held only that states may provide pregnant women with extra benefits
for physical disabilities from their unique condition. It did not say that
those benefits must be provided if women are to achieve equality in the
workplace.
One can see the ghost of Lochner in the way courts have interpreted the
second clause of the PDA, the clause requiring pregnant women merely to
be “treated the same. . . .as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.” The ghost of Lochner is particularly evident in
cases brought and lost by pregnant women because, as one court said, “em-
ployers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected
but nonpregnant employees.”75 Treating employees badly would not seem
to be good policy. It evokes visions of the sweatshops of the early 1900s.
Treating pregnant women badly also would not seem to be good policy.
Even treating employees well, but ignoring any possibility that pregnancy
and childbirth might create needs, such as time off and breastfeeding, that
do not occur with any other condition, disadvantages women. One can see
in these cases that while Lochner may have been overruled, its “rugged in-
dividualism” and its reluctance to have government interfere with employer
decisions still lingers.
7.5 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
Although the FLSA, passed in 1938, imposed wage and hour affirmative
obligations on employers and Title VII, passed in 1964, imposed prohibi-
tions, neither of those statutes required employers to provide maternity,
paternity or sick leaves, or health insurance. No statute required employ-
ers to accommodate just one group of employees. That changed in 1990.
Congress passed, and President George H.W. Bush signed, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).76 The ADA requires employers to make affir-
mative accommodations, even those that cost money, for disabled workers
so that they can work. The ghost of Lochner was not vanquished entirely
by the passage of the ADA, however. Two days after President George H.W.
Bush signed the ADA in June of 1990, he vetoed the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act (FMLA). He vetoed it again two years later. It was not until
75 Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.1994)(holding that a woman
suffering from morning sickness was fired for tardiness, not pregnancy); See also Can-
dace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties for Pregnancy,
Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 Vill. L. Rev. 355 (1999)(describing and critiquing many
cases brought unsuccessfully under the PDA).
76 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq.
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after President Clinton was elected, that the FMLA was signed into law.77
Perhaps the reason for President H.W. Bush’s differing treatment of the
two acts was that the ADA would enable those who are disabled to work
and therefore, it would be hoped, stay off welfare and pay taxes, while the
FMLA is about people on leave. Although those on leave are caring, without
pay, for babies and the sick and elderly, they are not “working” for their
employer. The Calvinistic “work ethic” of the United States’ early settlers
is an entrenched value as is the rugged individualist.
The FMLA was eventually enacted in 1993. It was the first act that Pres-
ident William Jefferson Clinton signed into law. It requires employers with
50 or more employees to provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for the
birth or adoption of a child, or to care for oneself or close family members
with serious medical conditions.78 These benefits may not seem like much
to people from European Union countries, or from many other countries
in the world, but as the history of social legislation in the United States
illustrates, these benefits were a big step in the American context.
The policies of the FMLA received support from a surprising corner, the
Supreme Court in an opinion written by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who is usually viewed as having been a conservative Justice. In Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,79 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the Court, held that one purpose of the FMLA was to remedy sex
discrimination caused by unequal family obligations.80 Then he held that
“state practices [which] continue to reinforce the stereotype of women as
caregivers” such as denying men leaves comparable to those for women,
discriminate on the basis of sex.81 Finally he held that a statute that “simply
mandated gender equality in the administration of leave benefits . . .would
allow States to provide for no family leave at all. . . .such a policy would
exclude far more women than men from the workplace . . .”82 Thus he noted
that an equal treatment policy, depending on the policy, can have unequal
results. He did not need to address however, whether the FMLA can provide
“special treatment” for women because that Act is written in gender neutral
terms, with the hope that it will encourage men to seek family leaves.
77 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Forward – Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & La-
bor L. 1 (2000).
78 29 U.S.C. §2601, et. seq.
79 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
80 Id. at 729




Supreme Court decisions demonstrate some of the values that compete
when the United States enacts legislation that regulates the workplace. I
would like to see the United States enact more “family friendly” legislation,
borrowing from examples in the European Union as so many workers strug-
gle in the United States to fulfill their family obligations without losing their
jobs. The history set forth in this paper helps to explain why the United
States has developed such an unusually strong reluctance to fund mater-
nity and other family leaves. Greater exposure to European practices and
integration with European law may soften this tradition.
Tracing the history of social legislation from wage and hour laws to
the Family and Medical Leave Act through the eyes of the United States
Supreme Court, shows how the United States has expanded its view of
the government’s role in the private workplace over time, but expansion in
Europe has occurred much more quickly. Americans have a long tradition
of opposing government power, particularly Federal power. This tradition
has made American legislatures and courts resistant to social engineering.
Family leave policies might seem to benefit all family members, but they
still imply government activism. There are many sociological explanations
for American attitudes, many of which have little to do with the law. Eu-
ropeans have been more comfortable with government intervention, but
this too may be changing. Some in the European Union may be questioning
whether generous benefits help or hurt their economies. Economists may
seek to compare the impact of governmentally funded, mandated leaves of
the European Union with the unfunded few mandates of the United States.
Determining which system is “best”, however, requires recognizing that
leave policies are not the only difference between the European Union and
the United States, and that “best” can be measured in many different ways.
This discussion has sought to identify and explain some of the origins
of American exceptionalism, and the gradual trend towards a more Euro-
pean model. Growing internationalization of the legal profession has made
new legal models available to lawyers in Europe and in the United States.
The law on both continents can only benefit from comparing our different
experiences.
